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Faith in Sovereignty: 




L’articolo muove dalle recenti dispute per la composizione delle differenze re-
ligiose in Canada e intende svolgere una riflessione più attenta sulle relazioni 
tra federalismo, sovranità e principio di laicità nel Paese. Il lavoro indaga le 
origini politiche e il dibattito scaturito dalla Charter of Québec Values, un do-
cumento proposto nel 2013-2014 dal Parti Québécois, partito indipendentista 
di minoranza che ha tentato di promuovere una peculiare visione di Stato 
“laico”. Nel contestualizzare questo documento nell’ambito della lunga storia 
canadese, dove il peculiare rapporto tra Stato e religione è servito a fornire 
argomenti per sostenere la diversità politica e culturale del Québec e per le 
conseguenti rivendicazioni di sovranità, l’articolo suggerisce che le afferma-
zioni sulla natura e sulle esigenze del principio di laicità abbiano fornito un 
moderno e potente strumento utilizzabile nelle politiche del federalismo.
Introduction
What is the relationship between the politics of federalism and the pol-
itics of secularism?
“All modern states… are built on complicated emotional inheritances 
that determine relations among its citizens”1. This claim could serve as 
an apt starting point for an inquiry into the politics of federalism and 
sovereignty. It would certainly fit the Canadian case well, where the 
question of sovereignty, which was central to the constitutional histo-
ry and evolution of the country over the second half of the 20th centu-
ry, drew on the deep and complicated history of the relationship be-
tween French and English language, culture, colonialism, and empire. 
Questions about the “emotional inheritances” that shape modern nation 
(1) talal aSad, “French Secularism and the ‘Islamic Veil Affair’” (2003), 8 Hedgehog Rev 93, at 102.
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states and their political paths, seem no less important to a keen under-
standing of the contemporary life of the EU, the recent debate on in-
dependence in Scotland, and the range of sovereignty issues that have 
arisen elsewhere in Europe and around the world. And yet Talal Asad 
did not have issues of federalism or sovereignty in mind when he made 
this claim; rather, he was interested in the question of secularism. 
Emotional inheritances, Asad argues in his essay on the headscarf de-
bate in France, are part of what defines the local shape and character 
of the range of secularisms that we find around the world. With this, 
Asad participates in an important literature that has developed over the 
last number of years, arguing that we simply miss too much of politi-
cal, historical, and particular interest in the capacious invocation of the 
general idea of “secularism”, writ large. This body of research has em-
phasized the broad range of political and legal configurations that sub-
sist under the general mantle of secularism, a rich variety of secularisms 
that is obscured by reference to a single modern phenomenon. Jakob-
sen and Pelligrini, for example, argue for a pluralisation of the idea of 
the secular, offering a range of studies of the ways that religion and po-
litical power can be disentangled in various historical and social con-
texts2. Ahmet Kuru’s examination of secularism in France, Turkey, and 
the United States draws out the diverse methods and mechanisms used 
to give local shape to the secular in each national setting, emphasizing 
in particular the influence of political history and responses to an an-
cien régime in the development of various approaches to realizing sec-
ularism3. These and other works have insistently called upon scholars 
to attend to the diverse range of local approaches to decoupling reli-
gion and political authority and the diverse social, institutional, and le-
gal dynamics involved in the ‘varieties of secularism’4. But in addition to 
(2) janet r. jakoBSen & ann PelliGrini, Secularisms (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
2008).
(3) ahMet kUrU, Secularism and state Policies Toward Religion: The United States, France, and 
Turkey (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
(4) See, e.g., Michael warner, Jonathan van antwerPen & craiG calhoUn, eds., Varieties of Secu-
larism in a Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010); JaMeS q. whitMan, 
“Separating Church and state: The Atlantic Divide” (2008) 34:3 Hist Reflect 86.
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constitutional histories and the peculiarities of institutional design, Asad 
emphasizes that there is an affective dimension to the politics of secu-
larism that lends it a different kind of political dimension, one that de-
fines community through memory and motivates through these “emo-
tional inheritances”. He explains that the forms of secularism are made 
various in part by virtue of the range of connotations and resonances 
that religion, and its relationship to power, can have within a particu-
lar culture and in a particular place: “The ways in which the concept of 
‘religion’ operates in [a] culture as motive and as effect, how it mutates, 
what it affords and obstructs, what memories it shelters or excludes, are 
not eternally fixed”5. These motives and effects engendered by religion 
are the raw material for the politics of secularism6.
This article seizes on recent debates about the accommodation of reli-
gious difference in Canada to think more carefully about the relation-
ship between secularism and the management of religion, on the one 
hand, and federalism and claims of sovereignty, on the other. In the 
fall of 2013, a minority sovereigntist Parti Québécois (Pq) government 
in the Province of Québec introduced Bill 60, a bill referred to as the 
“Charter of Québec Values” or, in much of the debate that ensured, the 
“Charter of Secularism”7. The bill sought to respond to one of the most 
contentious political issues within Québec at the time, namely the ac-
commodation and management of religious difference. Yet it did so in 
a way that appeared to run afoul of prevailing Canadian constitutional 
commitments to religious accommodation and multiculturalism. While 
it declared the religious neutrality and secular nature of the state, as 
well as the equality of men and women, it contentiously sought to pro-
hibit employees of public bodies (broadly defined) from wearing “os-
(5) aSad, supra, note 1, at 106.
(6) Although I have emphasized the literature arguing for a pluralization of the concept of sec-
ularism, there are also an important set of arguments to be made about that which links these 
varieties of forms of secularism together. See my discussion in BenjaMin l. BerGer, “Belonging 
to Law Religious Difference, Secularism, and the Conditions of Civic Inclusion” (2015), Soc Leg 
Stud, online: http://sls.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/09/18/0964663914549408.
(7) Charter affirming the values of state secularism and religious neutrality and of equality be-
tween women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests, 1st Sess, 40th 
Leg, Québec, 2013.
942 ISTITUZIONI DEL FEDERALISMO     4.2014
tentatious” or conspicuous religious symbols, such as Sikh turban, Jew-
ish kippot, and Islamic headscarves. With this proposed ban, the Par-
ti Québécois government charted out a form of secularism for Québec 
quite at odds with Canadian constitutional wisdom and thereby ignited 
a fierce debate, both inside and outside of Québec. Most agreed that if 
it were passed and challenged in the courts, this bill would be declared 
unconstitutional in light of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms8, with its protection of freedom of religion and religious equality. 
And yet the Parti Québécois government attempted to put this bill at the 
centre of a snap election called in the spring of 2014. For a variety of 
reasons, the Parti Québécois suffered a resounding defeat in that elec-
tion. And yet the “Charter of Secularism” has only been moved to the 
political background, not removed from the scene entirely. 
One story that can be told about this proposed Charter is simply a sto-
ry about the progressive stripping of religion from Québec culture and 
politics – the “secularization” of Québec. Since the 1960s, in a process 
referred to as the “Quiet Revolution”, the Roman Catholic Church has 
been ousted from its former position of cultural and political influence9. 
From a highly Catholic society since prior to Canadian Confederation 
in 1867, through to the 1960s, Québec has become less and less overtly 
religious and its strong identity with the Catholic religion has been re-
placed with something more akin to a pervasive antipathy. And so one 
way of reading this proposed Charter is as the next move in this pro-
gressive marginalization of religion in Québec public life. 
And yet that is not the story that I want to advance in this article. Rath-
er, I want to read this Québec Charter as fundamentally a piece in the 
ongoing story of Canadian federalism and the politics of Québec sover-
eignty. Read in this way, the Québec Charter is evidence that a polity’s 
relationship with religion is a potent resource for making claims about 
(8) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched-
ule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
(9) For more on the Quiet Revolution, see GreGory BaUM, “Catholicism and Secularization in 
Québec”, in david lyon & MarGUerite van die, eds., Rethink Church state Mod Can Eur Am (To-
ronto; Buffalo; London: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 149; david Seljak, “Why the Quiet 
Revolution was ‘Quiet’: The Catholic Church’s Reaction to the Secularization of Nationalism in 
Québec after 1960” (1996), 62 Hist Stud 109.
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political distinctiveness and identity. In Canada, the assertion of a dis-
tinctive relationship with religion has always been and remains one of 
the grounds for assertions of political and cultural distinctiveness and 
claims of sovereignty that are thereby engendered. Whether that lesson 
is transferrable to other political contexts is an interesting question; it 
seems, however, that claims about the management and relationship to 
religion are part of the genetic material of sovereignty in Canada. 
Following a swift and broad brush-strokes review of the history of the 
place of Québec in Canadian federalism and the development of the 
Québec sovereignty movement, I will review the genesis and features of 
the 2013 proposed Québec Charter of Secularism in greater detail. The 
next section will draw the link between the proposed Charter and claims 
of sovereignty, reading this moment in claims about secularism into the 
long history of federalism in Canada. The article concludes with some re-
flections on the links between secularism and political sovereignty. 
I. Québec Sovereignty and Canadian Constitutional History
Canadian federalism was formally established with Confederation in 
1867 and the passage of the first Canadian constitution, the British North 
America Act10. Yet the origins of the federalism that Confederation con-
stitutionalized had deeper roots. The Treaty of Paris, 176311, which set-
tled the claims between the French, British, and Spanish Crowns follow-
ing the Seven Years’ War, ceded all French possessions in what would 
later be Canada to the British Crown, which, in exchange, guaranteed 
certain rights – including the right to practice the Catholic religion – to 
the substantial population of French settlers living in the territory. This 
arrangement became more formal, with firmer territorial divisions, be-
ginning with the Québec Act, 177412. Very early on, then, the political 
structures in Canada recognized that, within a territory held by the Brit-
ish, some formal regard was necessary for the French Catholic inhabit-
(10) British North America Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3.
(11) Definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States, 3 September 1783, 
48 CTS 487 (entered into force 12 May 1784).
(12) The Québec Act, 1774 (UK), 14 Geo III, c 83.
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ants of what would later be Québec (though the long story of Canadi-
an political life is one of insufficient regard being given to the political 
sovereignty of the indigenous peoples). By the time of confederation 
in 1867, approximately 35% of the population of Canada was French, a 
number that has dropped to approximately 20% today. 
The constitutional structure established with the British North America Act 
afforded a list of powers to the federal and provincial governments, respec-
tively. Although on the face of the British North America Act it appears that 
Canadian federalism imagined a strong central government and compara-
tively weaker provincial governments, the reality was that, over the devel-
oping political life of the country, and through judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, provinces be-
came increasingly powerful, holding key heads of legislative power13. The 
British North America Act contained no bill of rights and remained a piece 
of UK legislation, amendable only in the UK, both issues that would be re-
solved with patriation of the constitution in 1982 and the enactment of the 
Constitution Act, 198214, complete with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Yet prior to 1982, and over the course of the 20th century, substantial shifts 
in political life within Canada took place. To the original 4 provinces that 
made up Confederation, 6 more were added. Canada gained increasing 
independence from the UK, through the Statute of Westminster, 193115, 
and other constitutional developments. In Québec, the crucial period in 
the development of the modern relationship between Québec and the 
rest of Canada came in the 1960s. Over the course of the 1960s, politi-
cal parties coalesced around a sovereignty movement and produced the 
Parti Québécois, which remains the chief provincial party within Québec 
advancing a sovereigntist agenda. Spurred on by events like Charles de 
Gaulle’s famous statement, “vive le Québec libre!” on a visit to Canada 
in 1967, from this point forward, the central dynamic of Canadian fed-
eralism would be Québec’s relationship to the rest of Canada, with the 
(13) For one account of this, see john t. Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shap-
ing of Canadian Federalism (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2002).
(14) Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
(15) Statute of Westminster, 1931 (UK), 22 & 23 Geo V, c 4.
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French language serving as the symbolic heart of the movement. In 1976, 
the Parti Québécois formed the government in Québec.
This sovereignty movement led to a referendum in 1980 in which 60% 
of Québecers voted “no” to a form of independence from Canada, sov-
ereignty association. Seizing the moment, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau 
moved ahead with a constitutional reform package that would bring the 
Canadian constitution home to Canada, with a domestic amending for-
mula, and would introduce the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. 
In a political trauma that would shape the years to come, the new con-
stitution was approved and passed without Québec’s agreement.
Over the course of the next 10 years, attempts were made to bring Québec 
into the constitutional fold with the Meech Lake Accord, 1987, and the 
Charlottetown Accord, 1992. Neither was successful in achieving the con-
sensus required by the new amending formula. Disaffection within Québec 
with the state of confederation, and a strong sovereignty movement, led 
to another referendum on sovereignty in 1995, this time resulting in the 
narrowest of negative results, with a “no” vote of 50.58%. This led to the 
famous Supreme Court of Canada decision in Reference re Secession of 
Québec16, in which the Court was asked to rule on the question of wheth-
er Québec could unilaterally secede from Canada. In a politically deft judg-
ment, the Court held that, although neither international law nor domestic 
constitutional conventions gave Québec a unilateral right to secede, under 
the conventions and principles of the Canadian constitution, a clear majori-
ty vote on a clear question would trigger a binding (but not justiciable) ob-
ligation to negotiate toward secession. Any such negotiation would, how-
ever, have to respect the principles of (a) federalism, (b) democracy, (c) 
constitutionalism and the rule of law, and (d) the protection of minorities. 
In the years following the Secession Reference, the Parti Québécois held 
the position of both the party of Québec sovereignty and the most sali-
ent socially progressive option in Québec politics. Flying these banners, 
the PQ achieved may electoral successes, as did its federal sibling, the 
Bloc Québécois. The sovereignty movement focussed its efforts on pro-
tecting and preserving the French language and French culture within 
(16) [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
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Québec and won a series of important legal and political victories in 
this regard. Moving into the 21st century, Québec governments succeed-
ed in securing powers and privileges for Québec within confederation, 
as well as in protecting French language and culture. Moreover, as the 
world moved through a financial crisis in 2008, Canada’s economy and 
banking system proved surprisingly resilient. 
In the result, by the early 2010s, the Québec sovereignty movement en-
tered a period of relative quiescence. Economically, it seemed to be a 
good time to be within Canada. Meanwhile, a set of important language 
issues had been fought and won on behalf of Québec, and this had 
been achieved within Canada. The political fortunes of the PQ lagged 
with an ebb in the vitality of the sovereignty movement. This was the 
situation in 2012 when a political scandal knocked the governing Lib-
eral Party from power and installed a minority PQ government, the first 
PQ government since the 1998 election. 
II. Religious accommodation and the Charter of Québec Values
Another issue of constitutional salience had emerged at the forefront of 
public debate in Canada over the first years of the 21st century, namely 
the management and accommodation of deep religious difference. Since 
the 1970s, Canada had adopted a formal policy of multiculturalism, and 
the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 added 
a constitutional rights dimension to the issue of religious freedom and 
equality. Although this aspect of the jurisprudence under the Canadian 
Charter had been somewhat slow to develop, the early 2000s saw an ex-
plosion of high-profile cases and issues surrounding religious freedom 
and equality, leading to a series of Supreme Court decisions on the na-
ture and scope of the right of religious freedom17. A number of the lead-
ing cases emerged out of Québec, one concerning the accommodation of 
Jewish Succahs within the regulations governing a condominium associ-
ation18, and another famously holding that, as a matter of freedom of re-
(17) See, e.g., BenjaMin l. BerGer, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture” (2007), 45:2 Osgoode Hall 
Law J 277; BenjaMin l. BerGer, “The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance” (2008), 21:2 Can J Law 
Jurisprud 245.
(18) Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47.
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ligion, a school was under an obligation to accommodate a Sikh student 
who wished to carry a ceremonial dagger, a kirpan, while at school19. 
Meanwhile Ontario had experienced a debate about the accommodation 
of Islamic law within its private arbitration scheme, resulting in provin-
cial legislation that purported to ban all faith-based family arbitration20. 
As they did elsewhere in the West, debates about the wearing of the reli-
gious symbols and clothing also took root in Canada21.
In both judicial decisions and public debate, the default frame for these 
conversations in Canada was the idea of multiculturalism – both its require-
ments and its limits. And yet this language had never sat entirely comfort-
ably within Québec, given that the cultural issue of chief salience in that 
province was, of course, the question of the preservation of Québec cul-
ture. Debates about religious accommodation, generated in part from these 
high-profile cases that began in the province, were particularly volatile and 
salient in Québec. In 2007, and in response to perceived public concern 
about the scope of religious accommodation, the Liberal government of the 
day struck a commission of inquiry into reasonable accommodation, ap-
pointing philosopher Charles Taylor and historian and sociologist Gérard 
Bouchard as commissioners. In its final report, the commission focussed on 
the idea of secularism, distinguishing “open” from “closed” forms of secu-
larism, and concluded that Québec had something of a different tradition 
regarding the management of religious and cultural difference22. The report 
also recommended that the Québec government should develop a white 
(19) Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6. For an analysis of the 
relationship between the Supreme Court of Canada’s leading decisions on freedom of religion 
and the politics of federalism, see SUjit choUdhry, “Rights Adjudication in a Plurinational state: 
the Supreme Court of Canada, Freedom of Religion, and the Politics of Reasonable Accommo-
dation” (2013), 50 Osgoode Hall Law J 575.
(20) See BerGer, supra, note 6.
(21) Juridically, this debate would make its most high-profile appearance in the case of R v NS, 
2012 SCC 72, which addressed the question of whether a Muslim sexual assault complainant 
would be permitted to wear the niqab while testifying in criminal proceedings. 
(22) Gérard BoUchard & charleS taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation ([Qué-
bec]: Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d’accomodement reliées aux différences 
culturelles, 2008). For further discussion of the context surrounding the Bouchard-Taylor com-
mission, see lori G. BeaMan, “Battles Over Symbols: The ‘Religion’ of the Minority Versus the 
‘Culture’ of the Majority” (2012), 28 J Law Relig 67 at 72–77.
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paper setting out a proposal for the management of religious difference 
within the province. Although the Liberal Government took some steps to-
wards addressing public concern about religious accommodation23, in the 
fall of 2013 the minority Parti Québécois government introduced Bill 60 – 
its “Charter of Québec Values” – putatively as a response to the Bouchard-
Taylor recommendation. 
In the debate that ensured, this bill was frequently referred to as the 
“Charter of Secularism”, a label that arose as a product of Premier Paul-
ine Marois’s claim that the legislation was designed to codify and en-
trench principles of state neutrality in matters of religion and, specifical-
ly, Québec’s commitment to secularism. One gains a sense of the char-
acter and thrust of the legislation by considering section 1 of the bill: 
“In the pursuit of its mission, a public body must remain neutral in re-
ligious matters and reflect the secular nature of the state, while making 
allowance, if applicable, for the emblematic and toponymic elements of 
Québec’s cultural heritage that testify to its history”.
Reference to the “emblematic and toponymic” elements of Québec society 
was necessitated by the saturation of day-to-day life in Québec with sym-
bols of the Roman Catholicism that it had reacted against in the 1960s. Street 
names like “St. Hubert” and “St. Denis” are omnipresent in Québec and the 
mountain at the centre of Montreal has a cross atop it, visible in many parts 
of the city below. Indeed, in the National Assembly, the legislative assem-
bly for the province of Québec, a crucifix hangs above the speaker’s chair.
The bill proposed a number of measures, including making amendments 
to existing human rights instruments by emphasizing a priority on gen-
der equality, and providing a broad scheme for the handling of requests 
for religious accommodation. A key amendment was the addition of the 
following new statement of purpose in the preamble to Québec’s existing 
Charter, the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms24:
(23) In 2011, the Liberal Government tabled Bill 94, which appealed to the idea of “open secularism”, 
found in the Bouchard-Taylor report, and which would prohibit any employee of the government de-
livering a government service, and anyone accessing such a service, from wearing a face covering.
(24) Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, RSQ, c C-12.
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“Whereas equality between women and men and the primacy of the 
French language as well as the separation of religions and state and the 
religious neutrality and secular nature of the state are fundamental val-
ues of the Québec nation…”.
This “Charter of Québec Values” was, thus, very much farmed as an ap-
peal to a particular claim about the nature of secularism, of the “car-
actère laïque de l’État”. 
However, the centrepiece of the bill, and the flashpoint for debate, was 
the proposed restriction on the wearing of religious symbols25. If the bill 
were passed, employees of public bodies would be prohibited from wear-
ing headgear, clothing, jewellery or other adornments that overtly indicat-
ed religious affiliation. “Public bodies” would be broadly defined as includ-
ing government departments, municipal authorities like transit authorities, 
school boards, colleges, universities, and hospitals and health services. In 
effect, after a transition period, the legislation would prohibit doctors, den-
tists, midwives, child care workers, and anyone else acting for and remu-
nerated by the states, as well as judges, tribunal members, police, and pris-
on guards, from wearing “conspicuous” religious symbols. Thus, the heart 
of the debate around this “Charter of Québec Values” or “Charter of Secu-
larism” was the following government-issued infographic: 
(25) For a discussion of this aspect of the bill, see richard Moon, Freedom of Conscience and 
Religion (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014), at 118-124.
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This proposal is one that appears more at home in France or Turkey 
than it does in Canada. It sparked enormous excitement and pitched de-
bate. There were substantial portions of the population within Québec 
that supported the bill, with proponents arguing that it captured the dis-
tinctive character of Québec’s relationship to religion and attitude to-
wards religious accommodation. Interestingly, sizeable segments of the 
population outside of Québec also voiced support for this kind of ban. 
And yet, within Québec, minorities and Anglophones, overwhelming-
ly concentrated in Montréal, as well as professionals and universities 
there, objected fiercely. In this, they joined with the dominant sentiment 
from outside of Québec, which characterized this proposal as discrimi-
natory and xenophobic. Many from outside Québec cast the debate in 
terms of Canadian multiculturalism at large, as contrasted with an ex-
clusionary and negative attitude towards minorities and religious differ-
ence in Québec society.
A number of features of the bill call for comment. First, Parti Québé-
cois proponents of the bill drew the strong link between this proposal 
and the French tradition of laïcité, arguing that the relationship to reli-
gion in France, which had famously led to a similar ban on conspicu-
ous religious symbols, was more natural to Québec society. Québec’s 
understanding of secularism, they argued, was more akin to the laïci-
té of France than the multiculturalism of the rest of Canada and Britain. 
Second, the bill was riddled with implementational problems and in-
consistencies. Finally, this aspect of the proposal seemed plainly uncon-
stitutional, as measured against the jurisprudence that had developed 
since 1982 under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Many made the 
rather safe prediction that if this bill were passed and challenged before 
the courts, it would be ruled inconsistent with the Charter protection 
of freedom of religion and guarantee of religious equality. Indeed, the 
Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, the 
Québec body responsible for promoting the rights and principles found 
in the Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, declared that 




These predictions were never tested, however, as the minority Parti 
Québécois fell in a snap election that it had called for the spring of 2014. 
Although it sought to turn that election into a referendum on Bill 60, eco-
nomic questions and other political dynamics intervened, confoundingly, 
to lead to the worst electoral defeat in modern Parti Québécois history. 
The “Charter of Values” would be placed on the backburner.
III. Secularism, Religion, and the Politics of Canadian Federalism
How might one understand the remarkable appearance of Bill 60 in 
Québec and the pitched debate that it engendered? What stories can be 
told to make historical sense out of this notable moment in the relation-
ship between law and religion in Canada? I wish to entertain two pos-
sible accounts, each offering a different vision of what was at stake in 
the introduction of this bill and, in particular, what role religion and re-
ligious diversity was playing in this affair. 
The first is a story of discontinuity and change in the role of religion in 
Québec politics and society. This account begins with the recognition that 
one of the defining characteristics of Québec society in the 18th century or-
igins of the country – indeed, perhaps the most politically salient, as I will 
explain – was its devout Catholicism. Québec society was thoroughly Cath-
olic in a Protestant Anglophone sea. The Catholic character of Québec so-
ciety would imprint on the early life of the province and exerted both cul-
tural and overt political influences on public life. Indeed, it is notable that, 
beginning in the mid-19th century, the ultramontane movement in Roman 
Catholicism gained a substantial foothold in Québec and a sympathetic 
ear among conservatives. Ultramontanism translated Papal supremacy and 
infallibility into a claim about the relationship between Church and state. 
Inferior to the Church in origin and nature, the state was beholden and 
should accede to the positions, directions, and interests of the Church. On 
this view, there was no principled basis for drawing a sharp line between 
the theological and the political, with the Church’s authority serving as the 
controlling principle for both. This vision of the relationship between reli-
gion and state authority had political purchase and was the subject of legal 
and electoral debate in the early life of the province27.
(27) See, e.g., Brassard et al v. Langevin (1877), 1 S.C.R. 145.
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And yet, jumping ahead to contemporary times, Québec is often now 
described as “the most secular province of Canada”28, with Québecers 
now highly skeptical of religious authority, and holding some of the 
most progressive views on social matters very much in tension with 
Catholic teaching. This radical transformation in the religious life of the 
province began in the 1960s with the “Quiet Revolution”, a fascinating 
moment in social history in which Québec society pushed back hard 
on the authority of the Catholic church and began a process of unteth-
ering the Church from public power in all domains of life. This hard 
break and rapid transformation left its mark on education, politics, law, 
language, and everyday social practices. 
Read in this story – about a highly religious society becoming non- and 
even anti-religious in a rapid transformation over the last half-centu-
ry – the introduction of Bill 60 and its “Charter of Values” appears as 
a contentious moment and a trouble spot, but one that is simply part 
of a process of the internalization of a vision of the secular. The na-
ture and details of the Charter were contentious, to be sure, but all of 
those distinctive features can be explained by Québec’s peculiar histo-
ry of a hard break with the Catholic church and by sensitivity around 
Francophone language and cultural identity. The debate that emerged 
around the Québec Charter, on this reading, best understood as es-
sentially about contested visions of what secularism should look like. 
Québec society had broken hard with a devoutly Catholic past and the 
Parti Québécois was seeking to formalize a French form of laïcité more 
natural and fitted to Québec society than the multiculturalism found 
elsewhere in the country. Bill 60 is best read as part of a story about 
discontinuity and change from a Catholic past to a secular present, the 
artefact of a fundamental shift in the role of religion in Québec’s legal 
and political life. 
There has, indeed, been a shift in the role of Catholicism in Québec 
and the religiosity of the society, and so this story has some appeal, re-
flecting certain truths. And yet, as is so often the case when appeal is 
made to “the secular” or “the secular nature of the state” (as though 
(28) BaUM, supra, note 8, at 149.
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the concept had a discernibly stable meaning independent of the po-
litical milieu in which it emerges), this story also seems to confound 
our understanding. To identify just one deficit in this account, consider 
the certainty and resolve with which Parti Québécois leaders appealed 
to the French inspiration for its vision of laïcité. This appeal is baldly 
anachronistic. The anti-clerical moment that defined laïcité in France 
occurred in 1905 Law on the Separation of Churches and the state29 and 
with the Third Republic. At this point, Québec’s embrace of Catholi-
cism has been firm since the 18th century and it was not until the 1960s 
that anything resembling a similar movement took place. There is, to be 
sure, something attractive in the appeal to an indigenous attachment to 
French laïcité, but that appeal is not a function of its historical accuracy.
And so let us see what can be taken from a differently framed story 
about what was at stake in the Parti Québécois proposing Bill 60. This 
account looks back to the origins of the Canadian state and sees that 
the Treaty of Paris, 1763, which settled the claims between the French, 
English, and Spanish Crowns in North America, included a single cen-
tral concession to the French in exchange for English control of Canada:
“His Britannic Majesty, on his side, agrees to grant the liberty of the Cath-
olic religion to the inhabitants of Canada: he will, in consequence, give 
the most precise and most effectual orders, that his new Roman Catholic 
subjects may profess the worship of their religion according to the rites of 
the Romish church, as far as the laws of Great Britain permit”.
In the Québec Act, 1774, an essential element of the founding of the 
province was the declaration “that His Majesty’s Subjects, professing 
the Religion of the Church of Rome of and in the said Province of 
Québec, may have, hold, and enjoy, the free Exercise of the Religion 
of the Church of Rome, subject to the King’s Supremacy, … and that 
the Clergy of the said Church may hold, receive, and enjoy their accus-
tomed Dues and Rights, with respect to such Persons only as shall pro-
fess the said Religion”. Looking ahead to Confederation in 1867, the 
(29) Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat, JO, 9 December 
1905. 
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British North America Act, 1867, the founding constitution, contained 
a provision – s. 93 – that protected denominational schooling. In 1996, 
the Supreme Court of Canada underscored the centrality of this provi-
sion to the historical compromise that created Canada: “Without this 
‘solemn pact’, this ‘cardinal term’ of Union, there would have been no 
Confederation”30. The lesson of this history is that the political identity 
of Québec in Canada was very much fashioned through claims about 
its special relationship with religion. 
This story also looks to the more modern political history of Québec 
and recognizes that the quiet revolution was co-emergent with the 
growing sovereignty movement, associating the reconfiguration of the 
relationship between the Church and life in Québec with a shift in 
claims about Québec’s place in confederation and the rise of the Par-
ti Québécois. The “Charter of Values” thereby becomes part of a sto-
ry that includes the fact that when the Canadian constitution was pa-
triated in 1982, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms became part 
of Canada’s supreme law, Québec did not accede to the new consti-
tution. That failure to sign on to the new constitution led to the refer-
enda on sovereignty and the continued political potency of the Par-
ti Québécois. 
So how does the Charter of Québec Values appear when read into 
this second story? What was at stake in its invocation, what were the 
motives and effects, to draw from Asad, that influenced its appeal to 
secularism? On this account, the Charter of Québec Values is part of 
a story of political continuity – not religious discontinuity and rup-
ture – whereby a distinctive relationship with religion has consistent-
ly been invoked as a dimension of the politics of federalism in Can-
ada. In the early years, Roman Catholicism was the foundation of the 
religious uniqueness of Québec, a singularity that was conscripted to 
secure political identity within the federation; today, the terms of that 
invocation have shifted from Roman Catholicism to laïcité, but the es-
sential role played by appeal to a unique relationship with religion 
has remained. 
(30) Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609, para. 29.
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Consider the political and constitutional dynamics engendered by the 
Parti Québécois’ Charter. The proposal came at a time when the Par-
ti Québécois had struggled with its sovereignty platform, in part be-
cause Canada had fared so well economically and so much had been 
achieved over the years for French language and culture within confed-
eration. In the context of a relative waning in sovereigntist sentiment, 
Bill 60 and a strong claim about Québec’s distinctive brand of secular-
ism presented to the populace a stark difference from the rest of Can-
ada in “the way we are” and did so on a point of tenderness and con-
cern: the accommodation of religious difference. In this short term, the 
politics of secularism opened up a Québec/rest-of-Canada divide that 
might energize and invigorate support for the Parti Québécois. 
Consider also the long-term possibilities, building from the observation, 
noted earlier in this article, that the bill, if it passed, was unconstitution-
al. How would this have played out, given Canada’s constitutional his-
tory and structure? If the bill were passed and challenged in the courts, 
the issue would likely make its way to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
This federal institution, sitting in Ottawa, would then assess the consti-
tutionality of a piece of legislation styled the “Charter of Québec Values” 
and likely rule that it was unconstitutional by reference to a constitution 
to which Québec had never agreed. This imagined unfolding would be 
a kind of sovereigntist political fantasy. 
If this story is convincing, then at a time at which there was an appar-
ent lack of appetite on questions of sovereignty, the invocation of a par-
ticular concept of secularism served political purposes in exciting a de-
bate within the federation. On this reading, an important dimension of 
the story of the Charter of Québec Values is a way in which the man-
agement of religious identity has consistently served as terrain on which 
political identity and sovereignty works itself out. The Québec Char-
ter was certainly an important moment in the ongoing debate – taking 
place within Canada and elsewhere – about the management of reli-
gious difference and the limits of accommodation. And yet religion and 
“secularism” are doing a great deal of other work when the proposed 
bill is read together with the politics of federalism. Recall Asad’s claim 
that secularisms emerge as a product of the polysemy and imaginative 
agility of religion, “what it affords and obstructs, what memories it shel-
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ters or excludes”. The invocation of French laïcité afforded certain po-
litical opportunities; it obstructed certain truths and memories. This epi-
sode was about secularism, but only as a currently available marker for 
a debate about distinctiveness and as a contemporary instantiation of a 
long-established role for religion in constructing the politics of belong-
ing – the heart of federalism – in Canada.
IV. Conclusion: Secularism and Federalism
The practice of states making claims about the political significance of 
religious expressions, and then backing those semiotic claims with the 
force of law, has emerged as something of a transnational pattern, a kind 
of habit of modern governance at a time at which religious difference is 
felt to be an issue of particular political salience. The headscarf has often 
been the focus of this symbolic work done in the name of one version of 
secularism or another, as the cases of France and Turkey show so clear-
ly31. In France, the 2003 Stasi Commission’s report on secularity in schools 
was provoked by public debate about the “Islamic headscarf” and wheth-
er girls should be permitted to wear these items in public schools. The 
Commission’s report led to a 2004 law that prohibited the display of 
“conspicuous religious signs”, a law that, as Asad shows so convincing-
ly, depended on the state involving itself deeply in questions of religious 
meaning and theological significance32. This work was underwritten by 
a set of commitments about the republican political identity of the state 
in which a brand of secularism, laïcité, plays a central role in the histori-
cal and emotional development of the policy. The idea that religion is not 
supposed to figure in the public lives of the French, however distracting 
that claim might be from the realities of day-to-day life33, has emerged as 
central to the construction of political community. 
(31) See carolyn evanS, “The ‘Islamic Scarf’ in the European Court of Human Rights” (2006), 7 
Melb J Int Law 52.
(32) aSad, supra, note 1. See also Mayanthi fernando, “Reconfiguring Freedom: Muslim Piety 
and the Limits of Secular Law and Public Discourse in France” (2010), 37 Am Ethnol 19.
(33) For a discussion of the rich associational life that exists beneath the claims of republican 
identity in France, see john r. Bowen, Can Islam Be French?: Pluralism and Pragmatism in a 
Secularist State (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011).
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In Turkey, the case of Leila Sahin v Turkey34 dramatized a similar role 
for the state construction of symbolic meaning, as well as a similarly 
strong claim for a commitment to laïcité as central to national identi-
ty, albeit arising from a profoundly different history than that found in 
France. Assessing a ban on the wearing of the headscarf at Turkish uni-
versities in 2005, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights set the issue within the history of the formation of the Turkish 
republic and the central role that a particular relationship with religion 
played in the revolutionary reforms that established the modern Turkish 
state. Leila Sahin’s wish to wear a headscarf during her studies at Istan-
bul University had to be read within a story about the abolition of the 
caliphate, the rejection of Islam as the state religion, and concerns over 
the recent rise in “political Islam”, which some understood as threat-
ening this commitment to Turkish political secularism. Again, wheth-
er this framing of the relationship between religion and the state accu-
rately captures the facts of religious life in Turkey was is not the point 
of greatest interest35; rather, what stands out from the Sahin case is that 
the margin of appreciation that the Grand Chamber granted to Turkey 
on the limitation of religious freedom was set by the idea that the po-
litical identity of the state – which, according to the judges, the govern-
ment has a right to defend – is forged through its peculiar relationship 
with religion36.
This symbol play as a way of defining a national relationship with re-
ligion and, thereby, a claim about political identity is not solely a phe-
nomenon arising in polities committed to ideas of laïcité and solely 
(34) Leila Sahin v Turkey, 10 November 2005, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Cham-
ber), No. 44774/98.
(35) For one account of the history and character of Turkish secularism, see taha Parla & an-
drew daviSon, “Secularism and Laicism in Turkey”, in janet r. jakoBSen & ann PelliGrini, eds., Sec-
ularisms (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008), 58.
(36) Judge Tulkens, writing in dissent, objected to the Court ruling on the symbolic valence of 
the headscarf and to the majority’s approach to both secularism and equality. Judge Tulkens 
insisted that “[e]quality and non-discrimination are subjective rights which must remain under 
the control of those who are entitled to benefit from them” (para. 12) and that “[w]hat is lack-
ing in this debate is the opinion of women, both those who wear the headscarf and those who 
choose not to” (para. 11).
958 ISTITUZIONI DEL FEDERALISMO     4.2014
concerned about the headscarf as a threatening appearance of Islam. In 
Italy, the Catholic history and identity of the country was harmonized 
with a commitment to religious equality and state neutrality when the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found that the 
practice of displaying a Crucifix in public school classrooms fell with-
in Italy’s margin of appreciation around the management of religion37. 
The intricate character of the symbolic exegesis involved in construct-
ing these claims about the relationship between religion, political iden-
tity, and the character of a modern secular state is apparent in the rea-
soning of the Administrative Court, cited in the Grand Chamber judg-
ment. Rather than an exclusionary expression of a particular religious 
affiliation for the state, Jesus dying on the cross was really a symbol of 
secularity:
“It can therefore be contended that in the present-day social reality the 
crucifix should be regarded not only as a symbol of a historical and cul-
tural development, and therefore of the identity of our people, but also 
as a symbol of a value system: liberty, equality, human dignity and reli-
gious toleration, and accordingly also of the secular nature of the state 
– principles which underpin our Constitution”38.
Catholicism, national identity, and secularity, are all read together in 
this remarkable hermeneutic exercise. And in the United States, expres-
sions of religious affiliation such as the reference to God in the pledge 
of allegiance have been interpreted as patriotic rather than religious ex-
ercises, what Justice O’Connor assembled into a category called “cere-
monial deism”39. In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor explained 
(37) Lautsi and others v Italy, 19 March 2011, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Cham-
ber), No. 30814/06. For analysis of this case, see jeroen teMPerMan, ed., The Lautsi Papers: Mul-
tidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom (Leiden; Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2012). For the purposes of this article, of particular interest is richard Moon, 
“Christianity, Multiculturalism, and National Identity: A Canadian Comment on Lautsi and oth-
ers v. Italy”, in jeroen teMPerMan, ed., Lautsi Pap Multidiscip Reflect Relig Symb Public Sch Classr 
(Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 241.
(38) Lautsi, para. 15, citing para. 11.9 of the Administrative Court’s decision.
(39) Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
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that “although these references speak in the language of religious be-
lief, they are more properly understood as employing the idiom for es-
sentially secular purposes”40. “It is unsurprising», she explains, «that a 
nation founded by religious refugees and dedicated to religious free-
dom should find references to divinity in its symbols, songs, mottoes, 
and oaths”41. National identity is forged through a particular relationship 
with religion, one that is now understood through a claim about culture 
and the character of the secular42.
The proposed Charter of Values was another expression of this pat-
tern. In asserted defence of a brand of secularism, the Parti Québécois 
government involved itself in the essentially theological work of de-
fining the significance of religious attire. The claims were not just pre-
scriptive but, rather, descriptive: they purported to reflect and respect 
the particular relationship between the Québec nation and religion. 
But the Québec case adds something of constitutional interest and im-
port, namely the display of how this pattern can also fit into and serve 
the politics of federalism. The story told in this article shows how de-
fining a distinctive relationship with religion has always been a key as-
pect of how Québec has distinguished its political character from that 
of the rest of Canada, securing for itself a unique place in the federa-
tion. That relationship was defined by attachment to Roman Catholi-
cism in the early history, reaction against it during the 1960s and the 
Quiet Revolution, and the claim is now being made that it is a differ-
ent form of secularism that plays a significant role in differentiating 
Québec from the rest of Canada. On the reading offered in this article, 
debate over the Québec Charter displayed the way in which secular-
ism is a handy tool in the toolkit of the politics of federalism, inter-
estingly at hand in service of claims of sovereignty. Whether that role 
for the politics of secularism is generalizable outside of the Québec 
(40) Elk Grove, at 35.
(41) Elk Grove, at 35-6.
(42) For an insightful examination of the way in which religious symbols are transformed in-
to “cultural” symbols, and the politics of this shift, see BeaMan, supra, note 16. Examining the 
Lautsi case and the Québec setting as cases-in-point, Beaman argues that “such a transforma-
tion allows for the preservation of a majority religious hegemony in the name of culture” (68). 
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and Canadian setting is not clear. Perhaps there are peculiar features 
of the Canadian national story – the attachment to official multicul-
turalism, the immigrant history of the country, etc. – that make it a 
unique case. I suspect, however, that this is not so and one can be-
gin to think of other constitutional settings in which working out rela-
tionships to religion has been tethered to claims of sovereignty. Step-
ping back, there are good reasons to think that we should view secu-
larism as an available resource in contemporary debates about feder-
alism and sovereignty.
Federalism is fundamentally concerned with the construction and ne-
gotiation of political identity. Given the historically central role that re-
ligion has played in the definition of community belonging and nation-
al identity, it would be odd, indeed, if contemporary debates about re-
ligion and contemporary debates about federalism did not converge 
and interact. Moreover, from a more theoretical perspective, the con-
cept that beats at the heart of federalism and independence movements 
– sovereignty – has an ineluctably theological flavor to it. One need not 
adopt the whole of his political thought to appreciate Schmitt’s insight 
in this respect:
“All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secular-
ized theological concepts not only because of their historical develop-
ment – in which they were transferred from theology to the theory of 
the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the om-
nipotent lawgiver – but also because of their systematic structure, the 
recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of 
these concepts”43.
If there is truth in this claim, why would one expect that federalism, it-
self a significant concept of the modern theory of the state, would be 
uniquely immune from the echoes and resonances between sovereignty 
and religion that contemporary scholarship on political theology points 
(43) carl SchMitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: Uni-
versity Of Chicago Press, 2006), at 36. 
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out to us44? And if, as Asad argues, secularism is profitably understood 
as a means by which the modern state secures its own power45 – if it is 
a political technology – we should expect that it would activated as a 
means of negotiating the power and sovereignty relationships at work 
in projects of federalism and political independence. 
The debate over the Québec Charter of Values was an important epi-
sode in the unfolding story of Canadian federalism. And yet what might 
prove of most interest to scholars of federalism is the way in which this 
episode serves as an invitation to think more carefully about the rela-
tionship between debates about the character of secularism and the 
contemporary politics of federalism.
(44) PaUl w. kahn, Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
(45) talal aSad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003).
